This paper studies a leader-follower partially observable stochastic game where (i) the two agents are non-cooperative, and (ii) the follower's objective is unknown to the leader and/or the follower is irrational. We determine the leader's optimal value function assuming a worst-case scenario. Motivated by the structural properties of this value function and its computational complexity, we design a viable and computationally efficient solution procedure for computing a lower bound of the value function and an associated policy for the finite horizon case. We analyze the error bounds and show that the algorithm for computing the value function converges for the infinite horizon case. We illustrate the potential application of the proposed approach in a security context for a liquid egg production example.
Introduction
Non-collaborative leader-follower games have been applied to security problems, e.g., the placement of checkpoints and canine units at Los Angeles International Airport (Jain et al. 2010 ). Game-theoretic approaches commonly assume that (i) the objective of the follower is well-understood, and (ii) the follower is rational and intends to optimize its expected criterion. However, it has been documented that these assumptions are often not realistic (Camerer 2011) . Fully understanding the objectives of an adversary (commonly modeled as the follower) in security domains is a formidable, if not impossible, task as the intent of the adversary can span a wide range of possibly unknown issues (Bier et al. 2007 ). Meanwhile, perfect rationality is often an unlikely human behavior (March 1978) ; the selection of actions may also depend on task complexity, the interplay between emotion and cognition, etc. (Conlisk 1996) .
In this paper, we address these issues by considering the case where: (i) the objective of the follower is unknown to the leader; and/or (ii) the follower is possibly irrational.
The intent of this research is to determine the best performance for the leader under the worst-case scenario regarding the behavior of the follower, assuming also that at each decision epoch the state of each agent cannot be precisely observed by the other agent.
We assume that both agents adapt to the actions of the other agent. Repeated Stackelberg games, repeated Bayesian games, and multi-period stochastic games were developed in order to capture the dynamic interaction between a leader and its adversary. Li et al. (2018) analyzed and computed the agents' security strategies for a two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian game. Examples of how to employ repeated Stackelberg games to model the interaction between a defender (the leader) and its adversary (the follower) can be found in the context of wildlife security (Yang et al. 2014 ) and fisheries security (Haskell et al. 2014 ). The stochastic game is a generalization of repeated games, where the state of the system evolves on the basis of the current state and the actions taken by all agents. Bakir and Kardes (2009) have employed a stochastic game model to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative interdiction strategies for cargo container security. Kardes et al. (2011) further introduced robust optimization to stochastic games for the case where reward structure and/or transition probabilities of the game are uncertain.
A key assumption of these stochastic games and their applications is that the state of the adversary is precisely known to each agent. This assumption, however, is unrealistic in many situations. Partially observable stochastic games are a new, relatively unexamined generalization of stochastic games that takes into consideration that the states of the game are not precisely observable to the agents and each agent selects its action based on these (possibly noisy) observations. A leader-follower partially observable stochastic game was used to assess adversarial risk for a liquid egg production facility in Chang et al. (2015 Chang et al. ( , 2017 ) under the assumptions that (i) the reward structure of the adversary is known and (ii) the adversary is perfectly rational. The research in this paper further considers the case where these assumptions are invalid. Thus, we consider a situation where the leader must make decisions based on only partial observations of the adversary, coping with not knowing the adversary's objectives and/or behavior.
We remark that researchers have employed robust optimization in single-agent partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) to address the ambiguity of model parameters. Itoh and Nakamura (2007) described the possible values for each parameter by an interval and specified a set of possible distributions for each unknown probability distribution. Osogami (2015) proved that the robust value function is still convex when the uncertainty set is convex. It is important to point out that a zero-sum partially observable stochastic game can be transformed to a robust POMDP under the assumption of S-rectangularity (Rasouli and Saghafian 2018) . The general modeling framework presented in this paper, however, considers general-sum non-collaborative games and does not require such assumptions.
Contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(i) We study a leader-follower partially observable stochastic game under a worst-case scenario where the leader does not know the follower's objectives and/or the follower is irrational. Our intent is to determine a best policy for the leader under these circumstances. Worst-case analysis has been a prevalent approach for establishing performance benchmarks in one-shot security planning (Simchi-Levi and Wei 2015, Caprara et al. 2016 ). These benchmarks have been further used to reveal the value of understanding the behavior of adversaries in single-period security applications (Nguyen et al. 2013 ). However, to our best knowledge, the counterpart analysis has not been explored for multi-agent partially observable stochastic systems in the existing literature. We fill this gap by extending the worst-case analysis to a partially observable stochastic game and identifying the baseline performance for the leader. Thus, this research is a first step for further evaluating the value of improved understanding of the adversary's behavior in multi-agent partially observable stochastic systems.
(ii) We investigate the structural properties of the leader's optimal value function. A key property of a POMDP is its value function is piecewise linear and convex. In contrast, the leader's optimal value function in this paper is only piecewise linear for the finite horizon case and can be an arbitrary function for the case where the total reward is discounted over an infinite horizon.
(iii) The modest structural results for the leader's optimal value function impose computational challenges. To establish a benchmark for the leader's performance, we present a backward recursive algorithm to efficiently construct a lower bound for the leader's value function for the finite horizon case. Specifically, the algorithm at each iteration approximates the optimal value function by a piecewise linear and concave function. Existing POMDP algorithms can then be employed to evaluate the worst-case performance for each leader's action. This algorithm further makes use of a geometric approach and mixed integer programs (MIPs) to determine the leader's value function. We evaluate the quality of the lower bound and show that the approximation function is no worse than the value function associated with the second best action of the leader and the approximation error could be zero under certain circumstances. We also show that this algorithm converges for the infinite horizon.
(iv) We illustrate these results using a liquid egg production problem, where the operations manager is attempting to protect the production facility against an adversary who intends to insert a biological toxin into the food production system. We test and validate our solution approach using simulation. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the leader-follower partially observable stochastic game, where the objective of the leader is to maximize the expected total discounted reward under the worst-case scenario of the follower. Section 3 presents the structural results of the leader's optimal value function. We discuss the computational implications of these results for determining the value function exactly.
In Section 4, we propose and outline a three-step solution procedure for constructing a lower bound for this value function, consisting of PURGE-step, DOMINANCE-step, and the APPROXIMATION-step. We discuss each of these steps in detail in Section 5-7. Specifically, Section 5 utilizes an existing POMDP algorithm to eliminate redundant vectors when constructing the worst-case value function for a given leader's action; Section 6 combines a geometric approach and a MIP to determine the optimal value function; and Section 7 approximates the resulting value function by a piecewise linear and concave function. The approximation function is used in the next iteration of the recursive algorithm. The error bound and the convergence result for the infinite horizon case are presented in Section 8. Section 9 illustrates the potential application of this approach to a liquid egg production problem. Finally, Section 10 summarizes research results and discusses future research directions.
Problem Statement
The partially observable stochastic game involves two agents: a leader and a follower.
The decision epochs are t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T where T < ∞ or T = ∞. Let {s k t , t = 0, 1, 2, ...}, {a k t , t = 0, 1, ...} and {z k t , t = 1, 2, ...} be the state, action, and observation processes for agent k ∈ {L = leader, F = follower}. The state space S k , the action space A k , and the observation space Z k are each assumed to be finite. We assume agent k knows its own state s k t , while the agent k can only partially observe the other agent's state through observation z k
At each decision epoch, the leader chooses its action a L t by assuming that the follower's
leader's information history at time t, where x 0 = {P (s F 0 )} is a priori probability mass
Let r(s t , a t ) be the scalar reward received by the leader at epoch t < T , given the state s t and action a t . The reward structure of the follower r F (s t , a t ), however, is unknown.
The criterion we consider v 0 (ζ 0 ) is the expected total discounted reward over horizon
β t r(s t , a t )|ζ 0 } for the finite horizon case and v 0 (ζ 0 ) = E{ ∞ t=0 β t r(s t , a t )|ζ 0 } for the infinite horizon case, where E{.|ζ 0 } is the expectation operator conditioned on ζ 0 , and β ≥ 0 is the discount factor. We assume β < 1 for the infinite horizon case in order to ensure that E{ ∞ t=0 β t r(s t , a t )|ζ 0 } is well defined. The objective of the worst-case analysis is to determine a policy pair (π L, * , π F, * ) :
We remark this model is different from a zero-sum partially observable stochastic game.
To see this, letã F t be the action actually selected by the follower in the zero-sum game,
where
} is a priori probability mass vector over S L . The actual actioñ a F t may be different from the worst response action a F t for the following two reasons, even if r F (s t , a t ) = −r(s t , a t ): (i) the follower may not be perfectly rational; and (ii) the rational follower selects its true actionã F on the basis of {ζ t } in the zero-sum game, whereas the leader determines a F t on the basis of the leader's information history {ζ t }. In the worst-case analysis, the private information history {ζ t } of the follower is unknown to the leader, and (π L, * , π F, * ) directly selects both a L t and the worst response action a F t at epoch t on the basis of information pattern {ζ t }. Thus, for any π
, where Π F is the policy space of the follower.
Structural Results
Let v t (ζ t ) be the maximal value of the worst-case expected total discounted reward to be accrued from epoch t until T , given information history ζ t . We intend to develop a recursive procedure for determining the optimal value function v t from v t+1 .
Thus, x t is a "belief" array indicating the leader's inference about the follower's state s F t . Define
is the stochastic array with scalar element
Let V be the set of all bounded, real-valued functions on S L ×X having supremum norm
Thus, v a L t and v t are dependent on ζ t only through (s L t , x t ), and (s L t , x t ) is a sufficient statistic for v a L t and v t .
Proof. The proof follows the same lines of arguments in Smallwood and Sondik (1973) and the fact that both
Proposition 2. ∀0 ≤ β < 1, the operators H a L and H are contraction mappings on V having modulus β.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 6.2.4 in Puterman (1994).
As a result, there is a unique fixed point v * ∈ V such that the sequence {v n }, where v n = Hv n−1 , converges to v * for any given v 0 for the infinite planning horizon.
A main result of a finite horizon POMDP is that its value function is piecewise linear and convex. We show, however, that it is not the case for the optimal value function v t . To see it, we say a real-valued function f (s L , x) for a fixed s L is piecewise linear 
is piecewise linear and concave (convex), we implicitly mean f (s L , x) is piecewise linear Proof. Assume v is piecewise linear. Equivalently, there exists a finite set Γ(
where the function l(z L , s L , a, x) defines the index of the γ vector corresponding to
However, Figure 1 illustrates that Hv may not be convex or concave, even if v is piecewise linear and concave (convex). Even worse, if v is not concave, then H a L v is not concave either, ∀a L ∈ A L . In the limit, operator H also does not preserve linearity. 
Lower Bound Solution Approach
We now motivate the development of the lower bound solution approach. Recall that for an arbitrary given piecewise linear function v ∈ V , neither Hv nor H a L v is concave.
Assumeṽ is a piecewise linear and concave approximation of
piecewise linear and concave. Theorem 1 below further shows that there is a finite set
Proof. The proof follows the similar line as in Proposition 3, and the fact that H a Lṽ is piecewise linear and concave.
We remark that each element of Γ(s L ) is associated with a pair of action (a L , a
leader's action a L , and each vector γ ∈ Γ(s L , k 1 ) is associated with a follower's worst-case action a F . The best worst-case policy for Hṽ can thus be determined by the following
the action pair associated with γ * , * .
By constructing a piecewise linear and concave functionṽ ∈ V satisfyingṽ ≤ v, we thus transform a part of the problem to a POMDP with an enlarged state space S L × X. As a result, many of existing POMDP algorithms can be extended to efficiently determine H a Lṽ , further paving a computationally possible and attractive way for determining Hṽ.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that Hṽ ≤ Hv, that is, Hṽ is also a lower bound of Hv.
We now present an algorithm to implement this idea. Specifically, assume the set
. We are interested in developing an algorithm to determine: (i) the set
Note that the contraction operator H and the development of the algorithm guarantee that ifṽ t+1 ≤ v t+1 , thenṽ t ≤v t ≤ v t . A three-step procedure is presented in Figure 2 .
, and it can be accomplished by the PURGE operation in the existing POMDP literature. Similarly,
that has the smallest cardinality and satisfies max
is the best piecewise linear concave approximation ofv t satisfyingṽ t ≤v t . 
Note that the resultingv t = Hṽ t+1 from the DOMINANCE-step is again not concave. In order to proceed to the next iteration, the APPROXIMATION-step approximatesv t by a piecewise linear and concave functionṽ t satisfyingṽ t ≤v t .
Performing all required operations and approximation, we have developed a backward recursive algorithm for determining a lower bound of the leader's best worst-case performance in a finite-horizon partially observable stochastic game. The pseudocode of the entire procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1. The rest of the paper presents each step in more detail.
Algorithm 1 Entire Algorithm for a Finite Horizon Partially Observable Stochastic Game
} is the best piecewise linear concave approximation ofv t (s L , x) andṽ t ≤v t , and evaluate the approximation error t (s L ) (Algorithm 5). end for Set t = t − 1. end while
PURGE Operation
A large number of γ-vectors could be generated in this step, however, only a small number of these vectors define the value functionv 
DOMINANCE Operation
We
is referred as supporting if there is at least one belief point x ∈ X such that
in Figure 3 are dominated sets, while sets G(s L , a L 2 ) and G(s L , a L 3 ) are supporting for v t . We seek to remove all dominated sets in order to define Γ t efficiently. Let the DOMINANCE operator be that Γ(s L ) = DOMINANCE(G(s L )) only contains supporting sets ofv t . We now present a two-step procedure for the DOMINANCE operator. To this end, we further say a set G(s L , a L ) is pair-wise dominated by a set Figure 3 . Figure 3 . The second step employs a mixed integer program (MIP) to further remove all dominated sets in Γ c t (s L ) to define Γ(s L ). Strictly speaking, only the second step is necessary, the main purpose of the first step is to substantially decrease the number and the size of MIPs encountered in the second step.
Determine the Superset
In computational geometry, the dual of a hyperplane p(u) = n−1 i=1 p i u i +p n in the primal R n space is the point p * = (p 1 , ...p n ) ∈ R n , and the dual of a point
The lower envelope of a given set of hy-
is the piecewise linear and concave function
whereas the upper envelope of the given set of hyperplanes is the piecewise linear and convex functionp(u) = max k∈K { The dual relationship between hyperplanes and points was first introduced to POMDPs in Zhang (2010) in order to provide geometric insights on existing POMDP algorithms.
In this subsection, we employ the dual perspective to define a superset Γ c t (
by efficiently removing all pair-wise dominated sets
We start with the following definitions. Similar definitions and explanations in the context of POMDPs can be found in Zhang (2010).
Given a set Ω ∈ R |S F | of points, the convex hull is the set Co(Ω) ≡ { j=1 λ j w j :
j=1 λ j = 1 and w j ∈ Ω, λ j ≥ 0, ∀j}. The surface of the convex hull with negative outernormal directions, the negative convex hull (N Co), is the set N Co(Ω) ≡ cl({w ∈ Co(Ω) : ∃x ∈ X + , xw ≤ xγ, ∀γ ∈ Co(Ω)}), where X + = {x ∈ X and x i > 0, ∀i}, and cl(B) is the closure of B. The following Lemma is the basis for developing the DOMINANCE operator.
, is dual to the set N Co(Ω). Namely, for anyx ∈ X,
Proof. It follows the proof of Lemma 1 in Zhang (2010).
We now determine whether a set
based on the geometric relationship. Without loss of generality, assume s L is given and
Proposition 4 shows that determining the dominance relationship is equivalent to check whether Φ(γ) is empty for every γ ∈ G(s L , a L ). The pseudocode is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Pick ∀x ∈ X and letγ ∈ arg min{xγ :
there is x * ∈ X such thatv a L (s L , x * ) = x * γ * . Lemma 1 further guarantees that there is
0 ) by assumption, both functions are continuous, and X is connected, the two functions intersect over X.
Algorithm 2 Determining the Pairwise Dominance between
Initialization:
PairwiseDominance=FALSE; break; end if end for
We remark that from geometric perspective, we also can determine the dominance on
) could be empty in the dual space. A counterexample is given Figure 4 .
The result follows by the assumption thatv
(a) primal space (b) dual space 
and K 2 (s L , k 1 ) by the following: For each candidate set G(s L , a L ), the algorithm compares it with the existing sets in Γ c (s
will be eliminated from Γ c (s L ). Meanwhile, K 1 and K 2 are updated accordingly.
Randomly generate x ∈ X, and calculate: 
Determine the Set Γ t (s L )
We now determine the set Γ t (s L ) by further removing the dominated sets from Γ c t (s L ).
Assume s L is given. ∀x ∈ X, let z 1 (x) be the function value attained by the super-
t (s L )}, and z 2 (x) be the value of
can be evaluated via the following mixed integer program (1):
where M is a large positive number.
The objective function is to find the minimal gap between the two functions, z 1 (x) and z 2 (x). As z 2 (x) is a piecewise linear and concave function on X, it can be easily determined by the first constraint. The second and the third constraints define z 1 . For the purpose of explanation, ∀k 1 ∈ K 1 (s L ), we further introduce a variable η k 1 as the minimum value attained by set Γ c
Piecewise Linear Concave Approximation
Given a set of γ-vectors Γ t , the value functionv t (s L , x) = max
} is piecewise linear but not concave. The iterative algorithm we developed requires a piecewise linear and concave function for the next iteration. We thus approximatev t by a functionṽ t satisfying the following conditions:
is a piecewise linear and concave on X;
(iii) the distance betweenṽ t andv t is as small as possible, where we define the distance between two bounded functions v 1 , v 2 ∈ V as
Equivalently, for each s L , we want to determine a setΓ t (s L ) such thatṽ t (s L , x) = min{xγ : γ ∈Γ(s L )} satisfies conditions (ii) and (iii). For computational efficiency, we consider the case whereΓ t (s L ) ⊂ Γ t (s L ) in this paper. We do acknowledge thatṽ t (s L , x) may be further improved by constructing γ / ∈ Γ t (s L ) for some instances. Determining a general procedure for finding the best piecewise linear and concave approximation of an arbitrary piecewise linear function is an interesting research topic for the future.
associated with an action pair a = (a L , a F ). Thus, it is easy to explain and implement the policy associated with the lower boundṽ t (s L , x).
We remark that the maximal gap between two functions v 1 , v 2 ∈ V for a given s L ∈ S L must occur at (i) where two segments of v 1 (or v 2 ) intersect, or (ii) extreme points of X.
Thus, ∀s L ∈ S L , we could determine the setΓ t (s L ) satisfying conditions (ii) and (iii) by a finite set of belief points W ⊂ X. Given s L ∈ S L , the pseudocode of determining
Step 1: Initialize W 0 by including the following two groups:
Extreme points : extreme points of X are e i , i ∈ S F , whose i th entry is 1; 0 elsewhere.
Witness points: the PURGE operation has identified at least a witness point
Step 2: Construct the concave approximation setΓ n (s L ) by the concave approximation MIP (2) on the set W n .
Step 3: Check if the condition (ii) is satisfied on X by the verification MIP (3). If the condition (ii) is violated, the verification MIP will return an x * ∈ X withṽ t (s L , x * ) >v t (s L , x * ). Add x * to the set W n .
Step 4: Evaluate the maximal gap betweenṽ t (s L , x) andv t (s L , x) by an error bound MIP (4) . If the maximal gap (s L ) is positive at point x ∈ X, W n+1 = W n ∪ {x } and update N = |W n+1 |.
Step 5: Go to Step 2 and update the concave approximation set
We initialize the set W 0 in Step 1, by including the extreme points of the belief space X and at least a witness point for each γ-vector in Γ t (s L ). These witness points are generated by the PURGE operation discussed in Section 5. We develop a concave approximation MIP in Step 2 to construct an initial setΓ t (s L ) based on W n . As the condition (ii) is only enforced on the set W n in Step 2, Step 3 further determines if the
we update W n by including x * .
Step 4 determines (s L ), the maximal distance between
To improve the approximation quality and reduce the gap betweenv t andṽ t , we also add the belief point at which the maximal distance is attained to the new set W n+1 . The program continues to updateΓ t (s L ) based on W n+1 .
The entire procedure stops when no further improvement is identified. When it stops, the condition (ii) is guaranteed on X and the maximal distance betweenv(s L ) and its approximate valueṽ(s L ) is bounded above by (s L ). We now detail each step in the following subsections.
Concave Approximation on W
Assume s L ∈ S L is given. Let W = {x i } be a set of belief points in X, N = |W |,z i be the maximum function values attained at x i by the setΓ t (s L ), and z i be the function values attained at x i by the set Γ t (s L ), i.e.,z i =ṽ t (s L , x i ) = min{x i γ : γ ∈Γ t (s L )}, and
With the aid of additional binary variables for evaluatingz i , we seek the setΓ t (s L ) by the following mixed integer program (2) :
1 ≤
Minimizing the distance betweenv t andṽ t (on W ) is equivalent to minimize the maximal gap g. The expression − i∈Iz i is added to the objective function in order to close the gap on W . The multiplier N on g is to ensure that the two quantities are within the same magnitude. The first to the fourth constraints computez i , ∀i. Specifically, the first constraint ensures thatz i is bounded above by the approximation function constructed byΓ t (s L ). Each binary variable η
is associated with a γ-vector in Γ t (s L ) and a belief point x i . The second and the third constraints are necessary to guarantee that ∀x i ∈ X, there exists one and only one defining vector
fifth constraint is based on the observation that min
The second to the last constraint guarantees thatṽ t (s L , x) ≤v t (s L , x) on W and the last constraint determines
We can enhance the performance of the MIP (2) by providing a good feasible solution exploiting the structure results ofv t . Note that for any given k 1 ,v
and satisfies all three conditions. Pick any
a feasible solution to the MIP (2). Determining such initial solutions is straightforward and computationally inexpensive.
Verification on X
The concave approximation MIP (2) only ensures that the condition (ii) is satisfied on W X. The following mixed integer program (3) further checks whether the condition is satisfied on X:
The objective function is to minimize the difference between the two functions for a (3) is the same as MIP (1) where: (i) the value z 2 is determined by the first constraint, and (ii) the second and the third constraints and the binary variable ρ k 1 ,k 2 associated with each vector
If µ * < 0 at the belief state x * ∈ X, then x * should be added to W , and both of the MIPs (2) and (3) should be resolved. The process should continue until µ * ≥ 0.
Approximation Error
We now determine (s L ), the maximal difference between z 1 (x) based on Γ t (s L ) and its approximation z 2 (x) based onΓ t (s L ), by the following MIP (4):
The objective function is to find the maximal gap between z 1 (x) and z 2 (x). The first two constraints compute z 1 (x) on the basis of Γ t (s L ). As
s L , the binary variable y k 1 for each k 1 and the multiple-choice constraint on y k 1 ensure that there is exactly one k 1 selected to compute z 1 . Meanwhile,
for the selected k 1 . Similarly, the third and the fourth constraints compute z 2 (x). The binary variable ρ k associated with each γ-vector inΓ(s L ) and its multiple-choice constraint guarantee that there exists one and only one γ ∈Γ(s L ) defining z 2 (x).
The approximation error is bounded above by the objective value (s L ) ≥ 0, assuming at point x * ∈ X. To improve the approximation quality, we also include x * to update W andΓ(s L ). Note, the value function associated with the second best leader's actionv 2 nd best (s L , x) is a feasible solution to the MIP (2) and it is a second best min-
That is, the approximation function at any belief point is no worse than the performance induced by the leader's second best action. Moreover, the following Corollary shows the approximation error of the proposed approach could be zero when there is a dominant action of the leader.
Proof. Clearly, the set G(s L , a L, * ) satisfies the conditions (i)-(iii) and the pairwise dom-
Error Bound and Convergence Analysis for T = ∞
As has been stated earlier, the optimal value function satisfies v n = Hv n−1 and there is a fixed point v * ∈ V where v * = lim n→∞ v n . While directly determining v n on the basis of v n−1 can be challenging, we have developed an iterative procedure for determining a lower bound of v n . Let T : V → V be the (nonlinear) operator such that ∀u ∈ V , T u is the approximation of u satisfying the conditions (i)-(iii). Letṽ 0 = T v 0 . At each iteration, Algorithm 1 evaluatesv n = Hṽ n−1 and approximatesv n byṽ n = Tv n . We now show in Theorem 2 that the constructed sequence {v n } also converges in V . Thus, the proposed approach can also be used to solve, at least approximately, the infinite planning horizon. Denotev * = lim n→∞vn , clearlyv * ≤ v * .
Theorem 2. v n ≥v n ≥ṽ n and the sequence {v n } converges.
Proof. v n ≥v n ≥ṽ n is obvious by the definition of T and the fact that if u ≤ v, u, v ∈ V , then Hu ≤ Hv. The convergence of {v n } follows from the fact that (H • T ) is a contraction operator on V . To see it, we first show that ||T u − T v|| ≤ ||u − v||. Assume
Similarly, we also have
The following result further determines the error between v n andv n .
Clearly, { * n } is bounded. Let * = sup n≥0 * n . Then, ||v * −v * || = lim n→∞ ||v n −v n || ≤ * β 1−β .
An Illustrative Example
In this section, we consider the liquid egg production problem presented in Zhang (2013) to illustrate the potential application of the proposed approach.
Problem Description
Liquid egg products are widely used by the food service industry and as ingredients in other food products such as mayonnaise and ice cream (USDA 2015). A deliberate contamination in the liquid egg products by an adversary will breach food safety, leading to excessive morbidity and mortality. We now illustrate how to use the developed method to support the production manager in selecting a sequence of actions to protect against an unknown adversary, in order to maximize the long-run productivity of the liquid egg production facility. We allow for multiple attacks and each attack can be successful or unsuccessful. An unsuccessful attack occurs when the adversary launches an attack but fails to insert any toxin to the system (e.g., the adversary is caught by the manager during the attack). Thus, the production process will not be affected, and the manager needs to prepare for next possible attacks. After a successful attack, however, the manager has to stop the production process to remove inserted toxin and clean up the system. Thus, the game stops whenever a successful attack occurs. As the pasteurization process can significantly reduce the effectiveness of the botulinum toxin, we assume the manager needs to protect three The system transits to a new state once both the agents have determined their actions.
Observation space: The manager's observations of the adversary are the possible locations of the adversary. Thus, Z L = S F , |Z L | = 4. We assume that the manager has the ability to detect an attack (e.g., by testing) if the attack has successfully occurred.
Specifically, the observation matrix is
Reward structure, criterion, and objective: The system can produce L number of qual- detected, no package will be produced as the production stops and the manager has to clean up the system. We assume the manager will receive additional bonus b > 0 for successfully preventing an attack. Let p (q) be the probability of having a successful attack at a protected (unprotected) target. Assume 0 ≤ p << q ≤ 1. The cleanup cost is C for the manager to remove toxin from the system after a successful attack. Thus,
The criterion of the manager is the expected finite horizon total discounted reward 
Numerical Results
We first use t = T to illustrate the procedure in Algorithm 1. Table 1 summarizes the γ-vectors after the PURGE and DOMINANCE operations for s L ="Attacked" at Figure 7 shows the graph of the true value function v T and its approximationṽ T projected on the non-absorbing states of the follower (i.e., s F ="Attacked"). Clearly, v T (s L , x) (in blue) is not a concave function andṽ T (s L , x) (in red) is indeed the best piecewise linear concave approximation function of v T (s L , x). Let P ⊂ X be the region where the approximation is accurate, i.e., P = {x ∈ X : v T (s L , x) =ṽ T (s L , x)}. Then |P |/|X| = 78.63% (in terms of the Lebesgue measure), and the maximal approximation error (4.36%) occurs around the extreme point e 2 . 916  906  0  756  0  723  906  916  756  703  746  906  786  756  726  -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 Table 1 : Γ T (s L ), s L ="Attacked" Figure 7 : The true value function v T and its concave approximationṽ T Figure 8 shows the convergence properties of the overall procedure. The maximum deviation of the value functionv t+1 fromv t dev = max
declines as the algorithm proceeds, and the value functionv converges tov * after 27
iterations, wherev * (projected on the non-absorbing states of the follower) is plotted in The entire solution procedure was performed on an Intel 3.10 GHz processor having 6.00 GB memory. The total computation time for T = 30 was 156.31 seconds, where the PURGE, DOMINANCE, and APPROXIMATION operations accounted for 4.78%, 11.86%, and 83.45%, respectively. As at least a witness point was associated with each γ-vector in the concave approximation MIP (2), the sizes of MIPs in the APPROXI-MATION step are significantly larger than those of the MIPs in the PURGE step and DOMINANCE step (could be 10∼20 times larger).
In order to validate the solution procedure and computational results, we perform a numerical comparison among three policies by simulation. The first policy is the policy constructed according to Algorithm 1; the second policy assumes that the leader randomly selects its action whereas the follower selects the action minimizing the leader's value of criterion; the third policy determines the leader's action by the proposed algorithm whereas the follower's action is randomly selected. For ∀x 0 ∈ X, s L ∈ S L , we simulate the sample paths under the three policies. The performance measure of a policy δ is defined as the total discounted reward of the sample path generated by policy δ. deviation in the follower's policy (e.g., irrational behavior) will result in an improved leader's performance. As the goal of the proposed algorithm is to provide a lower bound estimate for the leader's performance, the proposed policy is not necessarily better than the second policy for any belief point x 0 ∈ X for each sample path. However, the proposed policy still significantly outperforms the second policy on average. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we performed the worst-case analysis for a partially observable stochastic game with two non-cooperative agents, a leader and a follower. This research provided a modelling framework and a solution procedure for analyzing the baseline performance for a leader concerned with a worst-case scenario affected by another agent's actions, where the state of the system cannot be precisely observed by each agent, and where the reward structure and the rationality of the follower are unknown. We analyzed the structural properties of the optimal value function of the leader v t and showed that this problem formulation cannot be transformed into a standard POMDP. Thus, we proposed a solution procedure to determine a lower bound of v t in the finite horizon.
We further analyzed the quality of the lower bound and showed that the proposed procedure converges in the infinite horizon. The solution procedure was illustrated by a liquid egg production example in a security context.
The lower bound was constructed by the setsΓ t (s L ) ⊂ Γ t (s L ), ∀s L ∈ S L . Future research should further improve the lower bound by efficiently searching γ / ∈ Γ t (s L ). It is also interesting to explore the feasibility of extending the existing exact and approximation algorithms for POMDPs to the proposed problem. The developed worst-case analysis provided a benchmark result for a multi-agent partially observable stochastic environment. Thus, the follow-up research may include investigating the value of improved understanding of the adversarial behaviors in non-cooperative partially observable stochastic games by comparing with the benchmark results.
